Indonesia’s election bears the signs of weakening democracy

Adding an element of farce, the court’s decision overruled a decision handed down that same day, following intervention by the court’s chief justice, who happened to be Jokowi’s brother-in-law.

Other key checking institutions have suffered a similar fate under Jokowi. The Corruption Eradication Agency (KPK), once a beacon of independence and probity in a law enforcement landscape deeply infused with corruption, has increasingly become an instrument of the executive. Under Jokowi, the KPK has played a major role in investigating and prosecuting senior politicians in ways that consolidate the president’s coalition.

In November 2023, police charged KPK chairman Firli Bahuri – whose appointment was itself seen as part of politicians’ attempt to capture the institution – for allegedly taking a large bribe from a minister under investigation by the KPK. At the same time, the police investigation of Firli continues long-running police attempts to undermine the Commission.

More worrying are signs that the integrity of Indonesia’s elections may be threatened. Most observers agree that since Jokowi was elected in 2014, there has been a steady democratic decline.

His presidency has featured increased use of coercion against opponents of the government – notably Islamists, but also liberal critics – targeted intervention in political parties, selective use of criminal prosecutions against bothersome coalition partners and reactivation of the military in several sectors of civilian life.

For example, the Suharto-era institution of village-level military officers, Babinsa, plays an increasing role monitoring the work of government at the village and urban ward level.

Yet, there was long a consensus among observers of Indonesian politics that, no matter how problematic such aspects of Indonesian democracy became, the open and competitive character of elections remained untouched.

That consensus is now challenged. Stories are accumulating of petty steps being taken by bureaucrats and security officials in Indonesia’s regions to obstruct Prabowo’s opponents and mobilise in favour of him and Gibran.

While these stories still need to be treated with caution, and are not unprecedented in democratic Indonesia, such interventions have, in the past, mainly affected local elections. Now Prabowo’s rivals fear a more centralised effort to mobilise the state apparatus.

Adding to the unease is that 271 of Indonesia’s regional government heads, including governors in many of the most populous provinces, are central government appointees rather than elected politicians – at least until the next round of regional elections in late 2024.

A Prabowo–Gibran victory appears the most likely outcome in 2024’s presidential election. This is not simply, or even mainly because the government apparatus in the regions might influence the outcome.

Jokowi’s tacit endorsement counts for a lot. The president remains extremely popular, with approval ratings of about 75 per cent. Many Indonesians appreciate his Suharto-lite focus on economic development without the most authoritarian elements of Suharto’s rule, supplemented by growing allocations of social assistance.

This is why Prabowo has reinvented himself as Jokowi’s No. 1 public admirer and courted his son as his running mate.

Their pairing puts Prabowo, a man with a deeply authoritarian political past, closer to the presidency. He was once Suharto’s son-in-law and the leader of a hardline faction of the military during the final years of that regime.

Observers of Indonesian politics debate whether Prabowo’s experience of compromise as a minister under Jokowi might have tempered the authoritarian instincts he acquired through his early political socialisation.

Under Jokowi, Prabowo has largely ditched the fiery populist rhetoric with which he tried to win the presidency in 2014 and 2019.

Regardless, it does not bode well for Indonesia’s democratic future that a new president with an authoritarian pedigree is likely to take office after his predecessor oversaw the capture of previously independent control institutions, transformed the state apparatus into an instrument to pursue political advantage and narrowed the space for political opposition.

Edward Aspinall is professor of Politics and head of the Department of Political and Social Change at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University. This article is part of a series from East Asia Forum (www.eastasiaforum.org) at the Crawford School of Public Policy in the ANU’s College of Asia and the Pacific.